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Introduction
In this paper, we study the problem of determining production and marketing equilibrium strategies for two competing firms under an unstable "surge" demand condition (e.g., seasonality), where we focus on the asymmetry in the firms' production cost structures. Demand fluctuation in general, and seasonality in particular, have been shown to be critical issues in aggregate production planning (Hax and Candea 1984) . Hax and Candea discuss several methods that managers can use to absorb changing demand patterns. In most practical situations, management can cope with a surge in demand by accumulating inventory over a period of time.
Any cost modeling of a production system must consider the fundamental question of what form the short-term cost function will take. Although convex cost production functions have been used extensively in the literature ( Vanthienen (1973) . Kunreuther and Richard (1971) and Kunreuther and Schrage (1973) investigate the interrelationship between the pricing and inventory decisions of a retailer who orders his goods from an outside distributor. However, in both of these papers it is assumed that the retailer maintains a constant price throughout the season.
Richard (1969) and
Of special relevance to the present paper are the formulations presented by Pekelman (1974) and Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987) . Pekelman (1974) considers a single manufacturer (monopolist) facing a convex production cost and a linear inventory holding cost who determines simultaneously the price and production rate over a known horizon where the demand function is linear in price but time-dependent. Pekelman makes use of a continuous time model and characterizes the solution graphically via optimal control theory.' The present paper continues a stream of research on Production-Marketing joint decision-making begun with Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987) , which models a manufacturer and a distributor in an industrial channel of distribution where the key issue investigated is the nature of the coordination within the channel over a period. The approach taken by that paper is that of a sequential differential game based on the Stackelberg formulation of the model (Varian 1984) . It is shown that, by varying his price and ordering rate over the season, the distributor can maximize his profits with respect to any possible manufacturer's price (called the "contractual price") held constant throughout the period. This yields a derived demand function to the manufacturer, who can then maximize his profits with respect to his time-varying production rate. These results can then be substituted back into the distributor's equilibrium policies to provide the unique characterization of the behavior of the system. (See also Jorgensen 1986.) We note that none of the aforementioned papers has considered the dynamic problem in a competitive setting. In fact, in the economic and game-theoretic literature, the usual assumption made is symmetry in costs between the competitors. By contrast, the present paper examines the noncooperative behavior of two firms asymmetric with respect to cost structure. The firms are in competition with each other over a specified period of time during which the price-sensitive demand is increasing-then-decreasing. The modeling approach taken is that of a noncooperative differential game. Nash equilibrium production and pricing strategies are derived. It is assumed that the two firms simultaneously maximize their profits with respect to any possible price set by the competing firm, where each firm can vary its price and production rate over the period. The strategic behavior of the system is characterized in terms of the dynamic behavior of the Productionsmoother's pricing, production and inventory policies, and the Order-taker's pricing and production policies.
One possible real-world scenario for our model is that of two competing aircraft manufacturers during a period in which there is a surge in demand, where one of the firms is forced to subcontract work due to capacity constraints and thus incurs increased marginal costs. For example, O'Lone (1988) reports that a surge in demand created pressure for Boeing to increase production rates in 1988. This in turn led the aircraft manufacturer to move more work outside the company, incurring higher labor costs, in order to avoid overburdening manufacturing capacity. More specifically, Ramirez (1989) tells how Boeing, in order to deal with this short-run production capacity problem, contracted with Lockheed Corporation to "borrow" 670 workers at premium pay. On the other hand, Boeing's major domestic competitor, McDonnell Douglas, was apparently operating below capacity during the same time period. The Financial Times of London reports that American Airlines had planned to pick up orders for McDonnell Douglas aircraft ' Feichtinger and Hartl ( 1985) also consider a single manufacturer under a more general demand function and relax the nonnegativity constraint for the inventory by allowing for shortages that are penalized by shortage costs. that had been placed by British Caledonian and later canceled (Oram 1989 Lockheed is certainly not the only firm in the commercial aircraft industry which can act as a subcontractor. In an August 1989 investment report on the Grumman Corporation, Merrill Lynch ( 1989) states: "Given that the commercial aerospace industry suffers from a crying need for skilled airplane workers and manufacturing capacity, two assets which Grumman has in abundance, we believe that some steps may be taken to bring demand together with supply." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the type of scenario we wish to model in this paper is that of an aircraft manufacturer operating at full-capacity (such as Boeing), which finds it necessary due to a surge in demand to subcontract work (e.g., from Lockheed or Grumman) and which competes or is likely to compete with another firm operating below capacity (such as McDonnell Douglas).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by formally stating the problem (?2). We then present the equilibrium policies for the Production-smoother and the Order-taker, as well as an analysis of the strategic implications of these policies (?3). (The mathematical development is presented in the Appendix.) Two numerical examples are then provided (?4). The final section contains concluding remarks which include a summary of the problem and the major results, as well as suggestions for further research (?5).
Problem Formulation
The Production-smoother and the Order-taker simultaneously and noncooperatively each attempt to maximize their respective profit over the same known time horizon. Each firm's profit equals its revenues minus its unit costs (which may include the cost of raw materials and of shipping), of production, and of holding inventory, subject to various constraints on inventory. (Note that there is no discounting of future profit streams since the period of concern is relatively short.) The constraints require that: rate of change in inventory is equal to the production rate minus the demand rate, inventory level is at all times nonnegative, and initial inventory and terminal inventory are zero. (The possibility that initial inventory and terminal inventory are equal but nonzero can also be accommodated easily in our model.) Hence, the two objective functions can be written mathematically as: As discussed in the Introduction, the Production-smoother has a convex production cost. This is the essence of his problem. In order to obtain sharp analytical results, we follow Pekelman ( 1974) and Eliashberg and Steinberg ( 1987 ) , which consider the case of a quadratic cost function. Our results are generalizable, however, to any convex cost function. In an exhaustive survey, Walters (1963) reports that "the equation relating total costs to output used by most authors is usually a quadratic." As discussed in Eliashberg and Steinberg ( 1987) , a quadratic cost function may be appropriate under various scenarios including, for example, the situation where there are only two input factors of production and the production function is given by the Cobb-Douglas formulation (Varian 1984 Here k, and k2 are parameters corresponding to the production efficiency of the Production-smoother and Order-taker, respectively. In each case, higher values of k correspond to higher production efficiency and lower production costs. We assume that each firm meets all of its demand, and thus cumulative production equals cumulative demand over the season: 
(P1 (t), Ql (t); P2(t), Q2(t))
and (2.6a)
112(P2(t), Q2(t); PI(t), QI(t)) (2.6b)
is the set of strategies { Pl (t), P* (t), Ql(t), Q * (t) } satisfying:
I (PI (t) , Qi (t); P2* (t), Q 2* (t)) ' I I (P * (t),5 Q * (t); P2* (t) , Q2* (t)) and (2.7a)
112(P2(t), Q2(t); P*I (t), Q*(t)) ' 112(P2*(t), Q2*(t); P* (t), Q*l(t)). (2.7b)
In other words, the Nash equilibrium strategies are optimal in the sense that neither firm can obtain a better performance for itself while its competitor maintains its own Nash strategy. Based on the considerations noted above, and from (2.1) through (2.5), we obtain the control formulation of the Production-smoother's problem below. 
The Equilibrium Policies and Their Strategic Implications
In this section, we present the equilibrium policies resulting from the simultaneous solution of Problems 1 and 2, and discuss the strategic implications of these policies in terms of propositions. The main proofs are presented in the Appendix. Readers interested only in the strategic (qualitative) implications of these results can proceed directly to the propositions.
We will find it useful to define constants A, B and C in terms of the basic parameters of the problem: Here t * is the zero inventory point which satisfies: As discussed in the Appendix, in order for the zero inventory point t* to exist, it must lie to the right of the point at which the market potential a(t) achieves its maximum value. Based on equation (3.2), we can describe the Production-smoother's inventory strategy over the entire period. Proposition 3.1 formalizes this aspect. PROPOSITION 3.1. Production-smoother's Inventory Strategy. If the Productionsmootherfinds it optimal to hold inventory, then he will begin the period by building ulp inventory, continue by drawing down inventory until it reaches zero at t*, and concluide by following a "zero inventory" policy from t* until the end of the seasonal period.
PROOF. This follows immediately from (3.2). See also (A.21 ) in the Appendix. LI The general structure of a Production-smoother's inventory policy described in Proposition 3.1 is robust with respect to the market structure he is facing. Pekelman ( 1974) has demonstrated that such an inventory policy holds for a pure monopolist. The analysis presented in Eliashberg and Steinberg ( 1987) , which focuses on manufacturer-distributor relationship in a channel of distribution facing a market with no competition, also shows the optimality of such inventory policies for both the distributor and the manufacturer. Moreover, for quadratic a(t) functions, Eliashberg and Steinberg ( 1987 ) provide explicit closed-form solutions (in terms of the basic problem's parameters) for t* and tA*;, the times at which the distributor and the manufacturer begin their zero inventory policies, respectively. Proposition 3.1 establishes this property for a firm acting in a competitive market. This result is expected because it captures the essence of production smoothing. However, a question of interest arises: What is the impact of the competitive market effect upon the time at which a duopolistic Production-smoother begins his zero inventory policy vis-a-vis the scenario under which he (the Production-smoother) operates as a monopolist? To investigate this, we examine a specific functional form for a(t). Recall that we denote by t* the beginning of the zero inventory policy for the Production-smoother in a duopolistic market; denote by t* * the corresponding variable for a monopolistic Productionsmoother.
If the market potential a(t) is given by a polynomial expression, then (3.3) can be solved easily by numerical means to obtain t* to the desired degree of accuracy. In general, if the market potential is given by a polynomial in t of order n, the solution for t* is given by a polynomial in t of order n -1. In particular, for the case of quadratic To investigate the impact of some degree of competition on the timing of the start of the zero inventory policy, a Taylor series approximation was developed for t* at y = 0+ and w = 1 -. The analysis immediately reveals that t* < t* *. We thus conclude that, in the case of quadratic market potential, the competitive pressure faced by the Productionsmoother pushes him to begin his zero inventory policy earlier than had he acted as a monopolist, and that in either case he will never hold inventory during the last quarter of the period.
Proposition 3.1 characterizes the essential features of the Production-smoother strategic behavior for any increasing-then-decreasing demand formulation. For the case of linear demand functions with quadratic market potential, the inventory equation (3.2) reduces to the expression: r(Aal/3)t(t* _ t)2 for 0 < t < t*, 11(t) =0 for t* < t < T (3.2a)
For y = 0 and w = 1 (i.e., the monopoly base case), the above expression reduces to (a,/6)(t** -t)2t for 0 < t < t**, and zero elsewhere, as in Eliashberg and Steinberg ( 1987) . Note that this implies that the Production-smoother will be building up inventory for precisely the first third of his inventory holding period-as he would do had he been a monopolist, but to a greater maximum inventory level-and drawing inventory down for the remaining two thirds of his inventory holding period. In general, if the market potential is given by a polynomial expression in t of order n, the nonzero portion of the Production-smoother's inventory equation will be a polynomial of degree n + 1.
Returning to the case of general dynamic market potential, a( t), in (3.4)-(3.7) below we present closed form expressions for the competitor's equilibrium strategies. Propositions 3.2 through 3.8 characterize these strategies. Note that because of the "coupling" effect between the two competing firms, the time at which the Production-smoother begins his zero inventory policy is also critical for the Order-taker who divides his production and pricing strategies into two parts determined by the Production-smoother's zero inventory point. As pointed out in the previous section, the Order-taker will never hold inventory. PROPOSITION 3.2. Production-Smoother's Production Strategy. During his inventory holding period, the Production-smoother will produce at a constantly increasing rate; during his zero inventory period, he will produce precisely enouigh to meet his demand rate, and his production rate will be decreasing proportionally to the market potential (a (t)).
Production-Smoother's Production and Pricing
PROOF. This follows from (3.4). See also Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987) . EZ Like Proposition 3.1, Proposition 3.2 captures another essential aspect of the Production-smoother's behavior which does not change qualitatively for any general demand function or under other market structures (Pekelman 1974, Eliashberg and Steinberg 1987) . The Production-smoother's strategy always will be characterized by a constantly increasing production rate before t* and a production rate identical to the demand rate and proportional to the market potential a(t) after t*. A Taylor series-based analysis, similar to the one taken in Proposition 3.1, reveals that the constant production rate for 0 < t < t* remains the same (dQl /dt = k1h1 /2) for the duopolist as it is for the monopolist.
The proportionality factor of a(t), that is, A/[2B/k, + 1], decreases, however, for the duopolistic Production-smoother. This implies that the duopolistic Production-smoother, facing a lower demand rate, decreases his production as he approaches the end of the season at a rate ( I dQ /dt I) that is smaller than that of a monopolistic Productionsmoother.
The next set of propositions focus on the second player, the Order-taker, and thus are unique to the competitive setting discussed in this paper. We also provide a comparison between the two competitors. PROPOSITION 3.3. Order-Taker's Production Strategy. During the Productionsmoother's inventory holding period, the Order-taker will be increasing his production rate; during the Production-smoother's zero inventory period, the Order-taker will be decreasing his production rate, and this decreasing rate will be proportional to the market potential (a(t)).
PROOF. This follows from (3.6) and (3.4). D Proposition 3.3 shows that, corresponding to the Order-taker's different (i.e., linear as opposed to quadratic) production cost structure, the firm has a different production strategy from the Production-smoother. However, the demand functions of the two players are structurally equivalent, and thus our intuition might tell us that the pricing strategies for the two players should be structurally similar. The next proposition confirms this. PROPOSITION 3.4. Pricing Strategies. Over the season, each player will increase his price past the time at which the market potential (a(t)) achieves its maximum (which occurs before t*) and then decrease his price.
PROOF. This follows from (3.5), (3.7) and (3.4). LII
The result presented in Proposition 3.4 is driven by the competitors' demand formulations; in particular, by the linear fashion in which a(t) and the competitor's price are incorporated in the demand functions (2.2a) and (2.2b). It is possible, of course, to posit alternative demand formulations where the pricing strategies differ from those described in the proposition. However, the following pricing rule will always hold for the Order-taker. For any convex downward-sloping demand function (i.e., 0D2/0P2 < 0 and a2 D2/aP2 < 0), whenever a(t) and P1 (t) are simultaneously increasing (decreasing), the Order-taker's price will also be increasing (decreasing). For more details, see the Appendix (?A.5).
Note that Proposition 3.4 does not imply that P2 is in general less than P1 or vice versa. However, we do have a result of this kind under a more specific condition. In order to explore further the strategic differences between the prices of the two competing firms, we will assume a symmetric market scenario (i.e., w = 2 ) in Propositions 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7. Define the price difference at time t as the Production-smoother's price minus
The Zero Inventory Subcase for the Production-Smoother
Under the parametric condition where t* does not lie to the right of the point at which a(t) achieves its maximum, the zero inventory case obtains, and the Production-smoother will follow a zero inventory policy over the entire season, as his Order-taker competitor always does. In this case, the mathematical solutions of Problem 1 (2.8)-(2.12) and Problem 2 (2.13 )-(2.17) simplify considerably. The double asterisk in the sequel indicates optimal decision variables for the zero inventory case. We summarize such scenarios formally in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3.8. Zero Inventory Subcase. There exist situations where the Production-smoother will follow a zero inventory policy over the entire season, as the Ordertaker always does. In this case, the Production-smoother's equilibrium policies will be similar structurally to the Order-taker, which are as described in Propositions 3.3 and 3.4. follows from (3.8 )-( 3.1 1) and the Appendix. See also Eliashberg and Steinberg (1984) . O Of course, sufficiently high inventory holding cost for the Production-smoother is one characteristic of the situation captured by Proposition 3.8.
PROOF. This

Numerical Examples
In order to make a "fair" comparison between the profitability of the two firms having differing cost structures as described in this paper, we will examine numerical examples where the average marginal production cost over the period for the two firms is identical. The zero inventory point is t* = 4.341 > 3, the point at which a(t) achieves its maximum. Thus, the optimal policies of ?3 hold. For the Production-smoother, the equilibrium strategies are: The relationship of (4.1) can be verified easily. The pricing, production, and inventory policies for Example 1 are illustrated graphically in Figures 4.1-4.3. (Note in Figure 4 .1 that there is a crossover of the price paths.) By substituting the equilibrium policies into the objective functions (2.8) and (2.13), we find that the Production-smoother has a larger profit than the Order-taker for both parts of the period ( see Table 1 ). EXAMPLE 2. Suppose now that, due to higher raw materials or shipping costs, the Production-smoother's unit variable cost is substantially higher than that of the Order-taker: -0.262t2 + 1.572t + 2.702 for 0 < t < t* Q2* (t) =-0.263t2 + 1.579t + 2.695 for t* < t < T.
As in Example 1, the relationship (4. 1 ) equating average marginal cost can be verified easily. Note that the Production-smoother's inventory policy in Example 2 is identical (to three decimal places) to the Production-smoother's inventory policy of Example 1. The equilibrium pricing and production policies are different from those derived in Example 1; they are illustrated graphically in Figures 4.4 and 4 .5. By substituting the policies into the objective functions (2.8) and (2.13), we find now that the Order-taker has a larger profit than the Production-smoother for both parts of the period (see Table 2 ).
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the problem of determining production and marketing equilibrium strategies for two competing firms, distinguished as the Production-smoother and the Order-taker. We focus on the asymmetry in the firms' production cost structures and, consequently, on the implications in the handling of inventory for an unstable "surge" demand condition (e.g., seasonality). To our knowledge, no such investigation has been undertaken before where the interface between production and marketing policies in a competitive context is explicitly incorporated. We have made three major assumptions in our analyses. First, we have invoked the premise of a quadratic cost function for the Production-smoother competitor. Second, we have assumed a linear cost structure for the Order-taker competitor who holds no inventory. Third, we have employed a linear duopolistic demand function. Although each of these assumptions has been supported conceptually (via mathematical axiomatization) or empirically (via statistical estimation), they nonetheless limit the number of scenarios for which the closed-form, analytical implications that we have derived might be applicable. However, qualitatively, the equilibrium strategies we have obtained appear to be generalizable and, for the most part, quite robust with respect to the underlying assumptions.
These assumptions allow us to pose the problem as follows. We seek open-loop Nash equilibrium production and pricing strategies such that neither competitor has any incentive to deviate from his strategies while his rival maintains his own Nash strategies. We address the following questions: What is the temporal nature of each firm's equilibrium production and pricing policies? For the Production-smoother, what is the temporal nature of the equilibrium inventory policy? We recognize explicitly the importance of synchronizing production and marketing considerations in such settings. Our results fall into two categories, those relating to production and inventory strategies, and those relating to pricing.
We obtain two major, generalizable insights with regard to production and inventory. These are: ( 1 ) the Production-smoother's constantly increasing rate of production, which becomes identical to the (decreasing) demand rate throughout the zero inventory period, and (2) the building-up-then-drawing-down Production-smoother's inventory strategy.
The first insight (the Production-smoother's production policy), which captures the essence of production smoothing, is a very robust one. It holds not only for any increasingthen-decreasing competitive demand function, but also for monopolistic Productionsmoothers (Pekelman 1974) as well as for the members of industrial channels of distribution (Eliashberg and Steinberg 1987) . The constant rate part of this policy will always depend on the inventory holding cost. The (decreasing) demand rate part of the policy will depend, of course, on whether the demand represents a monopolistic, dulopolistic, or channel setting. The second insight is driven by the existence of a strictly positive point in time beyond which the Production-smoother carries no inventory.
Given that the Order-taker carries no inventory throughout the season, his production strategy is identical to his demand, which is increasing-then-decreasing. It is interesting to note that the time at which the Production-smoother begins his zero inventory period is also crucial for the Order-taker in planning his production strategy.
We obtain several results with regard to pricing. First, the prices charged by the two firms will each first increase and then decrease. This pricing behavior is sometimes observed in practice where price reductions occur after a peak in demand (e.g., "end of season clearance"). Second, the Order-taker's price over the entire period is strictly lower than the Production-smoother's price whenever the sum of the Order-taker's variable and unit production costs does not exceed the Production-smoother's variable cost. Third, under symmetric market conditions, i.e., when the market potential available to the two firms is equal, the difference between the Production-smoother's price and the Ordertaker's price will be increasing at a constant rate until the zero inventory point, after which the price difference will be decreasing. A crossover of price paths is possible.
Under symmetric market conditions, we obtain the following two results with regard to the demands faced by the two players under the optimal policies. First, the Ordertaker reaches his peak demand earlier in the period than the Production-smoother. Second, the Order-taker's demand is strictly greater than the Production-smoother's demand over the entire period whenever the Production-smoother variable cost is at least as great as the sum of the Order-taker's variable and unit production costs. (This is the same condition as in the second pricing result above.)
While the "bottom-line" question-which competitor is more profitable?-is interesting to pose, it is very difficult to analyze for the general case due to the myriad number of parametric conditions that need to be considered. Hence, we chose to study numerical examples. In order to make the comparison fair in some sense, however, we held the average marginal production cost over the period for the two competing firms identical. Even under this condition, many possibilities exist for profitability comparison for the most general case. Our numerical examples suggest that no clear profitability pattern seems to emerge. This issue definitely deserves further study.
While we feel that our model is fairly rich, there still exist a number of interesting extensions and directions for further research. One natural extension would be to consider the case of competition among more than two firms. Another possibility would be to incorporate uncertainty into the model and allow for backlogging; this would require the use of stochastic optimal control. A third possibility would be to combine the model presented in Eliashberg and Steinberg ( 1987 ) with that of the present paper in order to gain insight into two distribution channels in competition with each other. Finally, an empirical study of the implications derived in this paper would undoubtedly provide crucial insights into the competitive production-marketing joint decision-making scenarios captured by our model.
Appendix. Developing the Nash Equilibrium Strategies
Our approach is first to derive the necessary conditions for the Order-taker problem which, we will see, leads to simplifications in the more complex Production-smoother's problem. We then solve them simultaneously. In the sequel, an asterisk will denote the equilibrium policies.
A. 1. Optimality Conditions for the Order-taker's Problem
The objective function (2.13) can be written: We are now in a position to explicitly describe the behavior of XI + p, and, hence, the firms' strategies. The relationship between XI + pI and the {-curve (A.20) determines the behavior of I,(t) and I,(t).
We first note that t(t) achieves its maximum where a(t) does. Further, there exist some to and t*, where 0 < to < t* < T, such that: The implications of (A.2 1) for the Production-smoother inventory policy are as follows. The Productionsmoother begins building up inventory at t = 0 until a point to at which time the firm begins drawing down inventory. Inventory is drawn down from to until it reaches zero at a point t*, called the zero inventory point.
From t* until the end of the season, T, inventory remains at zero. In order for t* to exist, t* > argmax { a(t) }.
Otherwise, the zero inventory subcase obtains, and the Production-smoother will follow a zero inventory policy over the entire season, and the equilibrium policies are given by (3.8)-(3. 11).
In (A.21), t* determines the behavior of X1 + P, and consequently the nature of all of the optimal strategies. Here (A. 19), (A.20), (A.21) and (3.1) can be used to obtain (3.2) and (3.3).
By (A.21): for 0 < t < t*, we have X1 + P, = X1(0) + hit; for t* c t < T, we have X1 + P, = t(t) Consequently, when dD (t)/ dt = 0, i.e., when D (t) reaches its maximum, dD (t)/dt > 0, i.e., D*(t) is still rising to its maximum point. 0
